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The nature of the agricultural farm firm requires producers to make 
numerous decisions during the production process. These management 
decisions, cropping patterns, input combinations, and capital replace-
ment expenditures have a major impact on the net returns to the farming 
operation. 
Agricultural producers face a wide selection of established risk 
transfer alternatives, such as crop diversification, futures contracts, 
forward contracts and the flexibility in management plans. Diversifica-
tion is an attempt to select crops whose prices and yields are inversely 
correlated. This reduces reliance on one specific crop and allows 
abnormal yield fluctuations to be spread between crops. The futures 
market provides a mechanism which enables produces to "hedge" against 
future price variations. Forward contracting helps remove future price 
uncertainty by guaranteeing a specified price through the use of legally 
binding contracts. Flexibility enables the producer to shift production 
plans to meet uncertain and unexpected price and yield variations. 
Producers in the Southern Great Plains region of the u.s. may also 
choose from a number of government risk avoidance tools. Each of these 
government risk management decisions has independent effects on the 
returns to the operator. The "correct" program choice may improve the 
economic viability of the agricultural producer. 
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The primary purpose of this study is to analyze the ability of 
current and proposed government commodity programs to reduce the level of 
risk inherent to agricultural producers. These programs have been 
designed to reduce risks, stabilize equity growth trends, and. increase 
the economic viability of individual agricultural firms. Commodity 
programs incorporate methods to reduce fluctuations in income caused by 
changes in physical production as a result of natural risks, such as 
weather, disease, and pestilence. Economic risk, the fluctuation in 
market prices caused by either domestic or foreign supply and demand 
shifts, is another type of adverse event faced by producers. The 
commodity programs are designed to shift a portion of these risks from 
the producer to society. 
Shifting these risks in a volatile and cyclical environment 
provides a unique and challenging atmosphere when designing an equitable 
commodity program. The importance of commodity programs and their role 
in agricultural firm survival is constantly increasing in magnitude. 
Research directed at specifying the incidence of commodity program 
benefits and limitations will hopefully guide producers and policymakers 
toward a common goal, one which will benefit both groups. Providing a 
program equitable to all or even a majority is itself a challenging and 
measurable task. This type of research will serve as a management tool 
designed to provide an insight into the possible results of various 
commodity programs. 
Several types of agricultural disaster assistance, rfsk management, 
and emergency relief programs, designed to provide increased stability, 
have evolved in recent history. The disaster payments program (DPP), the 
Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCI), the crop hail insurance program, 
and the deficiency payment ·program are analyzed in this study. The 
existing DPP and FCI programs have been the subject of recent debate 
because several studies have indicated that these programs have unde-
sirable effects·on the agricultural sector and the federal government 
(Miller and Walter; U.S. General Accounting Office; Johnson, et al.). 
Research which will identify and provide possible solutions to these 
undesirable effects is needed. 
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A review of the types of risks associated with the production of 
agriculture commodities will reveal the nature of existing risk manage-
ment programs. These risks are a major reason for the existence and 
evolution of current commodity programs. Risks, such as hail damage, are 
ideally suited for insurance programs because they are random over time, 
independent among farms and are not within the control of the producer. 
The second category of risks are also meteorological in nature and 
include natural hazards such as drought or excessive cold. This type of 
risk is less independently distributed_. Areas where the probability of 
crop failure is excessive represents a third category. These areas are 
subject to premium rates that prohibit any type of producer participa-
tion. The uncertainty of human nature and moral hazards, represent risks 
in the fourth category. These hazards are uninsurable because of the 
numerous personal risks which effect management decisions (Miller and 
Trock). These four areas of risks present the basis for the current 
commodity programs to be analyzed. 
Problem Statement 
Unstable prices and yields are a major cause of income variability 
for agricultural producers in Southwest Oklahoma. A long history of 
agricultural commodity programs has been introduced to help reduce 
income variability and increase the chance of firm survival. The 
disaster payments program, (DPP), enacted under the Agricultural and 
Consumer Protection Act of 1973 and controlled by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), is one of the current governmental 
commodity programs. While this program reduces income variability and 
increases the economic welfare of agricultural producers, it is a very 
costly program for the government. In addition to this cost, several 
inadequacies and inconsistencies exist with the current DPP program. 
Thus, Congress and other policy makers are examining alternative means 
of providing assistance to producers. 
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One such alternative being considered is the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program. Historically, this program has had a low level of participa-
tion. In 1976, only 17 percent of the eligible acreage was covered by 
the FCI program (Miller and Walter). If the FCI program is amended, more 
producers might be enticed to participate. Such amendments include 
subsidizing insurance premiums, altering current FCI and DPP program 
specifications, or completely discontinuing existing commodity programs. 
These possible changes lead to several questions concerning firm growth, 
level of farm income, chance of firm survival and structural impacts. 
Answers to these questions would enable legislators to take appropriate 
action to solve inadequacies and provide equitable assistance to agricul-
tural producers. An example of one inadequacy which is now a primary 
concern of policymakers is the burdensome governmental outlay of the 
DPP. During 1980 the government paid an estimated $750 million in direct 
payments to producers enrolled in the disaster payment program 
(Benjamin). Alternative programs or amendments to current programs 
could solve existing inadequacies and make these programs more self 
sufficient. 
To analyze these programs a whole-farm, firm-level simulation model 
is used. The model is designed so growth trends and survival rates can 
be determined in a stochastic environment. By utilizing these results 
producers can select the commodity program alternative which coincides 
with their individual goals and objectives. The producer's decision 
analysis will follow a more logical process if expected returns and 
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.probabilities can be determined. Legislators and policymakers can 
determine whether program goals parallel the results derived for 
individual farm settings. If these results are inconsistent with program 
goals, appropriate legislativeaction can be taken to solve existing 
inadequacies. A review of the public and private commodity program 
alternatives presents the basis for this study. 
Risk Management Alternatives 
Deficiency Payments Program 
The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 specified guidelines for a 
deficiency payments program designed to reduce the adverse price risks 
that producers face. Participation requirements for the 1980 program 
are less demanding than in previous years. No set aside acreage is 
required for producers of normal crop acreage (NCA) crops. Any producer 
of program crops can qualify for payments provided the producer 
completes the necessary application forms and accurately reports planted 
acreage. To be eligible for deficiency payments, the sum of producer's 
normal crop acreage must not exceed the NCA established for the farm. 
The deficiency payment is based on the target price and is multiplied by 
the established normal farm yield and the reported planted acreage. The 
deficiency payment acres are determined by applying an allocation factor 
as a ratio of the Normal Program Acreage to the National Acreage 
Harvested. This ratio must be between 0.8 and 1.0. 
Disaster Payments Program 
The disaster payments program was authorized by the Agricultural 
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and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 and is administered by the 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. The disaster 
program is also a direct payment program and is designed to alleviate 
income losses by reducing the adverse effects of yield variability 
resulting from natural hazards. The disaster program requirements are 
identical to those of the deficiency program. To be eligible for 
payments, producers must timely report crop losses due to disaster or 
other losses beyond the producer's control. An ASCSappraiser must 
examine crop destruction before the crop is mechanically destroyed. 
Presently wheat and grain sorghum payments are computed on 60 percent of 
the established normal farm yield times one-half of the applicable target 
price times the acres eligible for payment. 
Crop Hail Insurance Program 
Crop hail insurance is administered largely by private industry. It 
is designed to protect producers against crop and income losses caused by 
hail damage. Crop hail insurance can be purchased up to the date of 
harvest, giving producers complete control over the timing of the deci-
sion to participate. Premium rates depend on the risk factor for a 
particular area with the risk factor based on the historical amount of 
losses paid due to hail damage. As the losses for a particular area 
increase, the premium rates increase accordingly. The premium cost also 
depends on the amount of insurance per acre the producer selects. For 
wheat hail insurance in an area, two basic options are available. 
Producers who enroll in a crop hail insurance program during the early 
stages of the production process generally insure to cover production 
costs. Producers who defer enrollment, just prior to harvest, are 
generally covering the expected crop value. For the purposes of this 
analysis, the amount of insurance selected is. based on the production 
cost. Payments are established by a percentage loss calculation 
estimated by an appraiser. This loss is multiplied by the number of 
acres covered and the insured amount. 
Federal Crop Insurance Program 
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The current requirements for the all-risk insurance program were 
enacted under the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. This voluntary 
insurance program is designed to cover multi-peril hazards faced by 
agricultural producers and is controlled by the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (FCIC). Insurance is available to producers who are not in 
areas of excess risk. Some portions of the country are presently not 
included in the program because of excessive risks. The premium rates 
are based on the amount of insurance protection per acre, the risk 
associated with a particular area and the type of crop insured. Prior to 
and including the 1980 crop year there were no provisions for a premium 
cost subsidy. Currently the FCI program provides guarantee coverage 
levels of 50, 65 and 75 percent. The difference between the actual yield 
and the FCI guarantee is multiplied by the price elective selected. The 
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product is then multiplied by.the acres covered to derive the insurance 
payment. For purposes of this analysis, the title Federal Crop Insurance 
(FCI) and all-risk crop insurance are used interchangeably. 
Program Combinations 
These programs are administered so that producers may participate 
in several programs at once. Deficiency and disaster payments may be 
analyzed separately and in combination. Generally, if the producer 
qualifies for one of these programs, he is eligible for both. The 
deficiency and disaster program may also be combined with either crop 
hail insurance or all risk crop insurance. The deficiency and all risk 
program are also analyzed in combination. The deficiency program 
eliminates some of the exogeneous price variance while the all risk 
insurance guarantees against low yields due to unavoidable risks. 
Alternative government subsidy levels and yield guarantee levels are 
also evaluated. 
Previous Research 
Risk and uncertainty, the lack of perfect knowledge, plays a major 
role on the economic welfare of the agricultural sector. Intensive 
research has been conducted and numerous studies published concerning 
risk management practices (Hazell; Hardin; Mapp, et al.; Musser and 
Stamoulis). These studies have analyzed existing risk management models 
and no attempt is made to repeat these reviews. These articles have 
reviewed models which use such techniques as quadratic risk programming 
and MOTAD. 
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Hardin developed a simulation model that analyzes the effects of 
major capital purchases on firm-level situations. This simulation 
incorporates a whole-farm scenario and examines firm growth and chance of 
firm survival in a stochastic environment. Triangular, trended and 
correlated prices and yields are combined with enterprise data to 
generate balance sheet and cash flow information. These computations are 
used to determine chance of firm survival based on a specified minimum 
equity level. 
In addition to risk management practices much work has centered .on 
risk avoidance techniques. Policymakers are especially interested in 
ways to effectively reduce income variability by initiating equitable 
risk avoidance programs. The government, in struggling with this issue, 
has initiated many programs designed to maintain a reasonable economic 
balance in the agricultural sector. A historical record of these 
attemp~s was presented by Rasmussen, Baker, and Ward. Tweeten did 
additional work and pre~ented the past performances for several of these 
commodity programs. Tweeten's discussion of the FCI program indicated 
that, since the creation of the FCI program, it has not been large enough 
to materially reduce risk in the agricultural sector. Another limitation 
in the FCI program involves the inability of the program to protect 
farmers from the unstable prices associated with an uncertain market. 
The current program controlled by the Agricultural Stabilization 
and Conservation Service (ASCS) is the DPP. Miller and Walter described 
and analyzed both the current DPP and alternative combinations of pro-
grams for Kiowa County, Colorado. As a result of their analysis, they 
specified several major options to be considered by policymakers. These 
options include: continuation of existing commodity programs, 
subsidizing the private insurance industry for. providing coverage to 
producers, subsidizing premium payments paid by producers with a 
discontinuance of the DPP, and finally, a modification of the current 
disaster payments program. Their recommendation for the "correct" 
program is based on the particular goals established by policymakers. 
Casler did further analysis and compared the DPP, FCI, and crop 
10 
hail insurance based on their respective return over variable cost. He 
developed a set of worksheets designed to help producers select the best 
program based on the producer's goals and needs. Casler suggested a 
payoff matrix which utilizes the producer's subjective probability of 
crop yields. Either the risk adverter or risk neutral decision maker can 
determine which alternative with specified probabilities will yield the 
possible minimum or maximum income objective. 
The adequacy of current commodity programs, such as the DPP, has 
lead to several studies reviewing the limitations and benefits of such 
programs. The General Accounting Office (1976) published a report crit-
icizing the current DPP. This report listed numerous inadequacies and 
inconsistencies which should be considered by Congress before any legis-
lation is passed on commodity programs. The report presented solutions 
to these problems and detailed the implementation procedures which should 
be followed. Their analysis stated that additional consideration should 
be given to crop insurance as a viable alternative to the DPP. 
Historically crop insurance has been a voluntary program which has 
been hindered by minimal participation. Early work by Halcrow dealt with 
three types of crop insurance: all-risk crop insurance, area-yield in-
surance, and weather-crop insurance. He presented the basic assumptions 
and necessary conditions for each program. Halcrow detailed the ideal 
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situations necessary to make each program effective. Ray presented a 
text which provides detailed justification for risk avoidance techniques 
such as crop insurance. He described numerous types of crop insurance 
and listed the basic considerations and conditions for each. 
Miller and Track reviewed the major types of risk present in the 
agricultural sector. This analysis provided the base for presenting 
basic disaster assistance methods. Their analysis included a summary of 
governmental cost outlays in providing the existing assistance programs. 
Their criticism section left some important questions unanswered con-
cerning the effectiveness of proposed legislation. Questions unsolved 
included the role of private industry in providing insurance and the 
structural issue concerning maintenance of production patterns that are 
economically insufficient. This issue has initiated additional research 
in disaster assistance programs. 
Raup dealt with this issue and stated that guaranteed commodity 
prices do indeed cause different impacts on contrasting farm sizes. He 
felt that as price risks are reduced, large scale producers are able to 
purchase small family farming operations, thus having a large impact on 
the structural framework of American agriculture. Boehlje and Griffin 
. 
supported this statement and found that large farms compared to smaller 
units have a greater capacity to expand when risks are reduced in a· 
government price support program. They stated that this is primarily 
due to the higher equity levels in larger farms. Their study also indi-
cated that participation in a price support program will improve cash 
flows for a larger size farming unit compared to a smaller unit. The 
numerical results proved that the greater majority of benefits from 
risk avoidance programs do indeed go to larger producers. 
The issue of structural· impacts of commodity programs is argued 
from both sides. Gardner and Pope stated that there are two possible 
hypotheses that explain the trend i.n larger farming units: technical 
economies of scale and government policies. The authors dismiss the 
hypothesis of government policies because of a lack of adequate 
empirical substantiation. They believe that technical change is the 
mechanism causing change in the structural framework in agriculture. 
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Johnson,- et al., presented an overall view of the impact that risk 
avoidance tools such as income supports and direct payments have on the 
agricultural sector. They stated that prior knowledge of supported 
income or price will have an impact on planting patterns and decisions 
concerning expansion. They agree that this knowledge may lead to uneco~ 
nomical production of certain crops and this risk avoidance may lead to 
fewer and larger farming units. They believe that additional research is 
needed so policymakers can evaluate the impact of direct payments on in-
come distribution and resource·allocation. Answers to these questions 
will enable legislators to make correct judgments concerning agricultural 
policy programs. 
Objectives 
The major objective of this study is to evaluate the impacts of 
alternative government risk management programs on the economic viabil-
ity of the farm-firm. Secondary objectives of this study are: 
1. establish a farm scenario which represents a typical whole farm 
operation and simulate returns in a stochastic environment. 
2. analyze the effect on firm growth and survival rate of 
participation in selected alternative commodity programs. 
13 
3. compare the results. of current commodity programs with those of 
proposed government program legislation. 
4. determine the expected government cost associated with current 
and proposed risk management alternatives. 
The remainder of this study is arranged as follows. Chapter II 
presents a detailed examination of the study area, simulation model, and 
the farm scenario analyzed. The analysis of the farm situation includes 
land ownership, machinery inventory, capital expenditures, enterprise 
data, and price and yield assumptions. 
Chapter III describes the risk management alternatives analyzed. 
This is a detailed examination of the program assumptions and 
requirements. Chapter IV represents the results of the program 
alternatives analyzed. Chapter V presents the summary and conclusions 
that are drawn from the analysis. 
CHAPTER II 
STUDY AREA AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The area chosen for study is Jackson County which is located in the 
Southwest Oklahoma portion of the Southern Great Plains. The shaded 
area of Figure 1 represents the area of study~ Jackson County is 
"typical" with respect to the crops grown in the Southern Great Plains 
and weather in this area has a substantial influence on crop yields. 
Jackson County has a warm, subhumid climate, with an annual 
precipitation of 27.1 inches. The months of greatest rainfall are April 
·through October. January has the lowest average rainfall (.82 inches) 
while May has the highest average rainfall (4.7 inches). Dry spells of 
4 to 6 weeks occur during the summer months when rainfall is erratic. 
These drought periods often result in crop damages to grain sorghum and 
cotton, two of the principal crops grown in this area. Hot temperatures 
and dry winds compound the problem of low rainfall. July has the 
highest average temperature of 84.2 degrees with a recorded high of 120 
degrees, and January has the lowest average temperature of 41.1 degrees 
with a low of -11 degrees. Severe hailstorms generally occur somewhere 
in the county each year and hard red winter wheat, a primary crop in the 
area, receives some damage in portions of the county every year. 
Jackson County has a total land area of 518,400 acres. Of this 
total, 91 percent or 471,085 acres, are in farm land. Over 49,236 acres 




and the remaining 8 percent is devoted to other uses (Census of 
Agriculture, 1978). 
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The major crop enterprises are wheat and cotton. There are 274,400 
acres of hard red winter wheat and 101,300 acres are planted to cotton. 
Grain sorghum and hay are the other two crops which are of importance. 
There are 13,400 acres of grain sorghum and 13,500 acres of hay, mostly 
alfalfa (Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics, 1979). Cow-calf and stocker 
cattle enterprises are also present because the wheat allows for winter 
grazing. 
The Simulation Model 
A whole-farm capital investment simulation model developed by 
Hardin to analyze the long-term effects of capital purchases in an 
uncertain environment was modified for this analysis. The model permits 
incorporation of stochastic prices and yields to simulate the effects of 
risk on the farm operation. These random, correlated, and trended 
prices and yields are used to generate measures of firm growth and the 
risk bearing ability of the farm firm. 
This model is used to combine an uncertain environment with 
various commodity program alternatives. A typical farm operation is 
simulated in Jackson County. This scenario contains specific 
assumptions concerning levels of assets, liabilities, and net worth. 
The farm operation is simulated under alternative program selections and 
a comparison is made of the economic stability provided by each 
alternative. 
The components of the capital investment simulator are presented in 
Figure 2. First the initial input data is specified. These data include 
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jRead initial resource situation.! 
Read technical data Generate trended and 
assumptions and correlated yields and 
distributions. prices. 
l ' t 
Calculate annual production cost, returns, depreciation, 
investment credit, taxes, interest paid, etc. for the 10 
year period of operation and 100 replications. 
Calculate the net 
costs and. returns 
program chosen. 
! 
Calculate balance sheet 
information for each year of 
each replication. 
I 
Test for bankruptcy. Calculate 
and print parameters of the 
net worth distribution. 
effects on enterprise 
from the commodity 
R 
\11 
Calculate annual cash 
flows and net present 
values for each 10 year 
simulation. 
Calculate and print 
parameters of the distribu-
tions of cash flow compo-
nents and net present value 
value and the distribution 
of net present value. 
Figure 2. Flow Chart for the Capital Investment Simulator. 
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the current farm financial situation, the organization of production, 
proposed investment information and the risk management alternative to be 
analyzed. These data are stored and provide the initial base for each 
iteration. The program uses a set of prices and yields and the base in-
formation to calculate costs and returns, determine depreciation, repay 
existing debt, calculate income taxes and determine net returns. The 
effects of commodity programs are then added to net re·turns. These re-
turns are used to revise the balance sheet information, calculate net 
worth and test for bankruptcy. The net returns are also used to derive 
annual net cash flow information. Balance sheet information is printed 
for each year along with the distribution parameters for net worth lev-
els, cash· flow, and net present value. 
The model requires additional input data that remains constant dur-
ing the planning horizon. This includes total farm acreage, personal in-
come tax exemptions, minimum equity requirements, depreciation methods 
and interest rates for financial borrowing. Enterprise data, acres 
planted for each crop and animal weight gains where appropriate are spec-
ified. Additional information that affects depreciation, taxes, cash 
flow, investment credits or interest payments are also specified. Exam-
ples include existing loan liabilities, future capital investments and 
the market value of existing assets. 
The ability of the firm to generate sufficient cash to repay debt 
is important in evaluating the firm's stability. If net cash flow is 
positive, the program accumulates these funds for future use. If net 
cash flows are negative, they are financed by any reserve which has 
built up. If the reserves will not meet the deficit, the program checks 
the minimum equity level. This study specified the minimum level of 
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equity for both intermediate and long term assets at 30 percent. If the 
long termequity ratio is above the minimum, the deficit is financed 
through borrowing against intermediate and/or long term assets. If the 
equity level is below the minimum, the producer is considered bankrupt. 
The long-term, intermediate-term and accumulated borrowing totals 
for each year and iteration are calculated and summarized by the model. 
The number of bankruptcies that occur during the analysis is used to 
calculate the probability of firm survival for each year. The model 
also summarizes the probability and mean of a second mortgage, and the 
maximum refinancing which occurred. 
In addition to bankruptcies, results of the analysis are evaluated 
in terms of growth in net worth. The model calculates net worth each 
year and ending net worth at the conclusion of the planning horizon. 
Each scenario is simulated over a 10-year horizon and replicated 100 
-
times. The model presents maximum and minimum ending net worth, the 
range between maximum and minimum net worth, expected ending net worth, 
and the standard deviation and coefficient of variation of ending net 
worth. 
The program calculates the leverage ratio and percent equity for 
the farm scenario. The leverage ratio (ratio of debt to equity) is one 
measure of the risk bearing ability of the firm. This ratio is an 
indicator of the firm's ability to meet long-term claims against the 
firm. The percent equity ratio (ratio of net worth to total assets) 
describes the owner's claims to his assets. 
Virtually all of the detailed financial accounting data for the 
firm are calculated by the model and could be summarized for each 
replication and year of each scenario. Because these data are 




The farm firm selected for analysis is typical of a full-time 
farming operation in Southwest Oklahoma. The operator is assumed to own 
920 acres and lease an additional 480 acres for a total farm operation 
of 1,400 acres. The land, valued at about $835 per acre has a total 
market value of $768,000. The acquisition of land occurred in 1973 
(280 acres), 1975 (320 acres); and 1979 (320 acres). Debt against the 
land consists of three separate loans, each with a remaining balance, 
number of years to maturity and interest rate. Principal and interest 
payments are calculated annually throughout the period of the analysis. 
The total debt against the land is $380,689 resulting in a 49.6 percent 
beginning debt/asset position in land. A loan summary of land purchases 
is presented in Table 1. 
Machinery Inventory 
The machinery inventory includes tractors and equipment needed to 
operate the farm and was selected based on enterprise budgets, previous 
studies and conversations with farm management specialists in the area. 
The total market value of the machinery inventory is based on a depre-
ciated purchase price for each piece of equipment. The purchase price 
given corresponds with the machinery date of purchase. The depreciation 
method used to derive the market value was straight line with a 10 



































AThe purchase price per acre is taken from Farm Real Estate Market Developments, Economics Statistics 
and Cooperative Service, USDA. 
N 
....... 
percent salvage value. The total machinery complement is valued at 
$73,583 •. The farm building market value is $15,330 and is also derived 
using a depreciated purchase price. The machinery and building 
specification and market value are presented in Table 2. 
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Outstanding loan balances for machinery and buildings are based on 
the date of purchase, loan life and interest rate assumed for each item. 
The interest rate used tp calculate principal and interest rate is corre-
lated to the purchase date. The total remaining loan balances are 
$40,968 and $14,642 for machinery and buildings, respectively. This rep-
resents a beginning equity position in machinery and buildings of 62.2 
percent. A summary of outstanding loan balances for machinery and build-
ings is presented in Table 3. Operating expenses and unsecured debts 
account for an additional $115,000 debt against the farming operation. 
Overall, total assets have a beginning value of nearly $862,000, 
total liabilities equal $551,299 and beginning net worth is $310,613. 
The beginning percent equity is relatively low at 36.0 percent indica-
ting limited risk. bearing ability of the farm. Reductions in percent 
equity have large impacts on the economic viability of this scenario. 
Initial balance sheet information is presented in Table 4. 
Capital Replacement Expenditures 
Provisions are made for machinery replacement during the planning 
horizon. Based on the years of useful life and the purchase date, a set 
of machinery replacement purchases is specified. The purchase price in 
the expected replacement year is the price of the capital item in 1980 
inflated at six percent per year. Based on this purchase price and a 10 
percent salvage value, regular and accelerated depreciation and 
TABLE 2. Machinery and Building Specifications and Market Values 
Year 
Inventory Size A Purchased 
Machinery: 
Tractor 125.0 HP 1973 
Tractor 225.0 HP 1977 
Chisel 41.0 Ft. 1972 
Springtooth 54.0 Ft. 1978 
6 Row Cultivator 20.0 Ft. 1975 
6 Row Planter 20.0 Ft. 1976 
7R 2 Bar Lister 23.3 Ft. 1975 
Rollover M.B. Plow 9.0 Ft. 1979 
Drill 26.6 Ft. 1980 
Offset Disk 28.0 Ft. 1974 
Sprayer 20.0 Ft. 1978 
Pickup 0.5 TN 1974 

































TABLE 2. (Continued) 












Source: The size and purchase price specifications are from Oklahoma Crop and Livestock 




~arket value is determined by subtracting the yearly depreciation from the purchase price for each 
year the implement is owned. Depreciation is derived by subtracting 10 percent salvage value from the 
purchase price and dividing by the useful life of the implement. 
N 
~ 
TABLE 3~ A Summary of Outstanding Loan Balances for Machinery and 
Buildings 
Years Loan 
Remaining Interest Outstanding 
Inventory Size A on Note Rate Principal 
Machinery: 
Tractor 225. HP 4 8% $21,975 
Springtooth 54.0 Ft. 5 8 2,748 
6 Row Cultivator 20.0 Ft. 2 8 341 
6 Row Planter 20.0 Ft. 3 8 1' 370 
7R 2 Bar Liste·r 23.3 Ft. 2 8 199 
Rollover M.B. Plow 9.0 Ft. 6 9 3,833 
Drill 26.6 Ft. 7 10 5,638 
Offset Disk 28.0 Ft. 2 8 327 
Sprayer 20.0 Ft. 2 8 2, 341 
Pickup o.s TN 2 8 711. 
Mower 13.3 Ft. 4 8 1,485 
Building: 
Machine Shed 15 8 $14,642 
A The size specifications are from Oklahoma Crop and Livestock Budgets, 
Southwest Oklahoma. 
25 
TABLE 4. Initial Balance Sheet Information 































investment tax credit are calculated. The year the investment takes 
place, loan life, useful life, method of depreciation, and interest rate 
for the expenditure are specified as data. During the appropriate year 
of the analysis, each purchase occurs as scheduled and the corresponding 
effect on the balance sheet is computed.! A summary of the machinery 
replacement specifications is presented in Tabl~ 5. 
Additional Input Data 
Other input data applying to this farm scenario are presented in 
Table 6. Family living expenses for the beginning year are $16,000 and 
are inflated at 10 percent per year. The beginning cash reserve, which 
can be used to meet deficits that occur in the cash flow, is $5,000. 
The number of personal income tax exemptions is specified at four. 
Future borrowings against intermediate-term assets and long-term assets 
are assumed to have an interest rate of 10 percent and nine percent, 
respectively. 
lA common risk management technique among agricultural producers is 
to replace machinery following a good harvest and defer expenditures 
during low yield years. Machinery replacement for this scenario is 
assumed to be spread evenly over all years. This assumption may create 
a bias towards increased bankruptcy risk but this bias should not 
significantly alter the results. Since a timely replacement of 
machinery is specified, the additional maintenance and repair cost 
associated with deferred replacement is avoided. If this deferred 
replacement strategy is implemented during low yield years, additional 
repair and maintenance cost should be specified. 
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6. 6 Row Planter 
7. 7R 2 Bar Lister 
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~he expected future expenditure is based on the 1980 purchase price, from the Oklahoma Crop and Livestock 
Budgets for Southwest Oklahoma, with a 8% annual inflation rate on machinery. 
Bsalvage value is 10% of the expected expenditure. 
N 
00 
TABLE 6. Additional Input Data Specific to the Farm Scenario 
Annual Inflation Rate. for Land 
Annual Inflation Rate for Machinery 
Annual Inflation Rate for Buildings 
Number of Personal Tax Exemptions 
Long-term Equity Minimum 
Intermediate-term Equity Minimum 
Long-term Interest Rate 
Intermediate-term Interest Rate 
Average Age of Machinery 
Average Age of Buildings 
Family Living Expense 
Annual Inflation Rate for Family Living Expenses 
Discount Rate 


















Wheat, grain sorghum, cotton and forage enterprises are included in 
this analysis. Enterprise production costs per acre are based on current 
Southwest Oklahoma enterprise budgets (Oklahoma Crop and Livestock 
Budgets, 1980). The base costs include operating inputs, labor costs, 
annual operating capital, machinery charges and t.axes. The production 
costs per acre for wheat, grain sorghum and cotton are $72.07, $38.46, 
and $144.16, respectively. These costs are inflated six percent annual-
ly. The leased land costs $30.00 per acre per year and the cost is in-
flated at six percent per year. The organization of production, which is 
held constant over the period of the analysis, includes 600 acres of 
wheat, which is also a forage activity for winter grazing. The cotton 
and grain sorghum enterprise both contain 400 acres. 
Price and Yield Data 
Agricultural prices and yields are characterized by high levels of 
variability. The competitive structure of agriculture, the inelastic 
demand for agricultural commodities and natural hazards are major forces 
contributing to this variability in prices and yields. As a result the 
variation in net farm income received by agricultural producers is sub-
stantial. A combination of high yields and high prices for commodities 
results in favorable net farm income. The reverse holds true for low 
prices and low yields. The adverse effects may be partially offset by 
participation in commodity programs or private crop insurance programs. 
To simulate variability realistically, historical price and yield 
data are needed for the farm situation analyzed. Because actual farm 
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level data are not reported, county average yields per harvested acre 
from 1966-78 for Jackson County, Oklahoma are utilized. These data for 
wheat, grain sorghum, cotton and forage are presented in Table 7. 
Commodity prices for Jackson County are not reported continously over an 
extended period of time. Thus, season average prices for Oklahoma are 
used in the analysis. Observation of the differences between annual 
prices for the Southwest area and for the entire state revealed those 
differences to be minimal. Annual prices for the four commodities 
included in the organization of production for the period 1960-78 are 
presented in Table 8. 
Correlated Prices and Yields 
The model uses triangular distributions of yields and prices to 
simulate yield and price variability. The yields of the commodities 
included in this analysis are not independent at the farm level. 
Drought conditions during the summer will likely affect cotton and grain 
sorghum yields adversely. In addition, poor.moisture for summer crops 
will generally mean poor moisture at wheat planting time and a consequent 
decline in final yield the following year at harvest. Reasons for crop 
price correlations may not be as clear, however, an assumption of inde-
pendence seems inappropriate. Correlations between and among yields and 
prices are built into the model based on the historical yield and price 
series. 
Seasonal and cyclical variations are typical for many agricultural 
product prices. Using the Statistic Analysis System (SAS) to adjust the 
data for these variations, a first through fifth degree polynomial func-
tion of time was fit to each series. The resulting models were compared 
TABLE 7. Yield Series Used to Test Long Term Trends, Jackson County, 
Oklahoma Yield Series 
Wheat Grain Sorghum Cotton Forage 
Yield Yield Yield Yield A 
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Year (BU/Acre) (BU/Acre) (Lbs./Acre) (Lbs./Acre) 
1966 20.7 53.1 344.0 2195.0 
1967 13.2 47.4 340.0 1752.0 
1968 21.0 39.5 411.0 2197.0 
1969 27.1 50.9 338.0 1896.0 
1970 24.0 44.5 322.0 1772.0 
1971 22.7 43.6 301.0 2367.0 
1972 14.0 31.4 370.0 2843.0 
1973 24.7 39.1 500.0 2550.0 
1974 15.6 37.5 302.0 315.0 
1975 23.4 51.2 352.0 3434.0 
1976 20~3 36.2 349.0 2011.0 
1977 22.3 36.8 508.0 ·1547.0 
1978 21.8 45.1 417.0 1953.0 
Source: The yield series is derived from the yield per harvested acre 
in Jackson County, Oklahoma. Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics, 
Oklahoma Department of Agriculture. Various issues. 
AThe forage yield series was derived from Oklahoma State Experiment 
Station. Results from the Mangum, Oklahoma Test Station. 
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TABLE 8. Price Series Used to Test Annual Trends, Jackson County, 
Oklahoma Price Series 
Wheat Grain Sorghum Cotton Forage 
Price Price Price Price 
Year ($/BU) ($/BU) ($/lb) ($/TN) 
1960 1.75 .80 .27 53 25.04 
1961 1.80 .99 .3075 23.58 
1962 2.04 1.00 .2908 24.04 
1963 1.90 1.00 • 2993 27.46 
.1964 1.46 1.08 .2636 28.75 
1965 1.36 1.02 .2594 24.46 
1966 1.66 1.08 .1720 26.33 
1967 1.47 1.00 .2117 27.67 
1968 1.25 .95 .1967 26.88 
1969 1.23 1.09 .1973 27.88 
1970 1.33 1.13 .2000 33.13 
1971 1.42 1.06 .2837 34.63 
1972 1.70 1.41 .2590 33.92 
1973 3.56 2.29 .4950 45.79 
1974 3.95 2.86 .2990 55.92 
1975 3.43 2.36 .4720 57.13 
1976 2.78 2.00 .6110 63.92 
1977 2.32 1.86 .4660 66.58 
1978 3.00 2.02 .5390 67.08 
Source: The price series are seasonal average prices received by 
Oklahoma producers. Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics, Oklahoma 
Department of Agriculture. Various issues. 
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to determine which model explained the most variability based on t-values 
and the R2 value. The residuals from the most significant model for each 
commodity were used to calculate a price correlation coefficient matrix 
between the commodities. These price residuals are presented in Table 9. 
A correlation coefficient matrix of yields is also needed for the 
analysis. Yields were tested for time trend and no significant yield 
trends were indicated. Thus, the yield correlation matrix was derived 
directly from the data itself. The matrices for prices and yields are 
presented in Table 10. 
To generate triangularly distributed and appropriately correlated 
yields and prices, the correlation matrices must be factored into an 
upper and lower triangular matrix (Clements, Mapp and Eidman). Each 
correlation matrix has its own unique upper right triangular matrix and 
both are used as input in building a set.of triangularly distributed 
prices and yields. These price and yield upper right triangular 
correlation matrices are presented in Table 11. An annual time trend 
value of four percent is specified for prices. A zero trend value is 
specified for yields. 
The final step in generating the triangularly distributed prices and 
yields is to specify the parameters of the triangular distribution: the 
minimum, maximum and modal values of prices and yields for every 
commodity. The minimum yield values for wheat, grain sorghum and cotton 
are set equal to zero to reflect the possibility of weather or natural 
hazard destroying the ·crop. The modal values are chosen to approximate 
the modes of the historical yield and price series. A combination of 
historic data and expected yields is used to choose the maximum values 
for wheat, grain sorghum and cotton. The price and yield parameters for 
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TABLE 9. Residuals Used to Derive the.Price Correlation Matrix 
OBSERVATION WHEAT. GRAIN SORGHUM COTTON FORAGE 
1 0.07266 0.05659 0.179 2.5119 
2 -0.14702 -0.00998 0.278 -2.1872 
3 0.06430 -0.09861 -1.799 -3.0200 
4 0.04583 -0.09591 0.918 0.3563 
5 0.19977 0.03986 -0.006 2.2476 
6 -0.09627 0.04887 2.443 -1.3078 
7 0.36600 0.15960 -3.818 1.0110 
. 8 0.26027 0.08896 1.767 2.1878 
9 0.02323 -0.00779 0.688 0.3888 
10 -0.12490 0.02299 -0.215 -0.6072 
11 -0.25041 -0.10668 -2. 340~ 1.6114 
12 -0.49606 -0.39642 2.295 -0.9113 
13 -0.60114 -0.29746 -5.014. . -6.4985 
14 0.85859 0.32735 13.018 -0.1307 
15 0.89085 0.67351 -12.361 4.1941 
16 0.12690 0.02494 -0.393 -0.2894 
17 -0.056853 -0.35612 9.423 1.4261 
18 -o. 7720 -0.32900 -6.971 0.2305 
19 0.56266 0.25530 1.706 -1.2135 
TABLE 10. The Correlation Coefficient Matrices for Triangularly Distributed Prices and Yields, 
Southwest Oklahoma 
Wheat Sorghum Cotton Forage Wheat Sorghum Cotton 
Price Price Price Price Yield Yield Yield 
Wheat Price 1.0000. 0.92545 0.05399 0.35398 o.o o.o o.o 
Grain Sorghum Price 0.92545 1.0000 -0.16602 0.44098 o.o o.o 0.0 
Cotton Price 0.05399 -0.16602 1.0000 -0.06420 0.0 o.o o.o 
Forage Price 0.35398 0.44098 -0.0642 1.0000 o.o o.o o.o 
Wheat Yield o.o 0.0 o.o 0.0 1.0000 0.38926 0.24459 
Grain Sorghum Yield o.o o.o o.o 0.0 0.38926 1.00000 ~o.33092 
Cotton Yield o.o o.o o.o o.o 0.24459 -0.33092 1.0000 













TABLE 11. The Upper Right Trangular Correlation Matrices for Prices and Yields, Southwest Oklahoma 
Wheat Sorghum Cotton Forage Wheat Sorghum Cotton Forage 
Price Price Price Price Yield Yield Yield Yield 
Wheat Price 0.30872 0.87948 0.07687 0.35398 o.o o.o o.o o.o 
Grain Sorghum Price o.o 0.88685 -0.13799 -0.44098 o.o o.o o·.o 0.0 
Cotton Price o.o o.o 0.99794 -0.06420 o.o 0.0 o.o o.o 
Forage Price o.o o.o o.o 1.0000 0.0 o.o o.o 0.0 
Wheat Yield o.o o.o o.o o.o 0.82598 0.47929 0.20025 0.21896 
Grain Sorghum Yield o.o 0.0 o.o 0.0 o.o 0.93412 -0.35262 0.05553 
Cotton Yield 0.0 o.o o.o o.o 0.0 0.0 0.97408 0.22619 




the triangular distribution are presented in Table 12. 
Data for the forage series are from Oklahoma State University 
Experiment Station results for the Mangum test station in Southwest · 
Oklahoma (Denman and Arnold; Rommann~ McMurphy, and LeGrand, 1976; 
Rommann, McMurphy, and LeGrand, 1977; Rommann, McMurphy, and LeGrand, 
1978; McMurphy). The data are in pounds of dry forage harvested per 
acre of wheat pasture for the entire growing season, with some clippings 
taken as late as June. Because this analysis assumes that wheat is 
harvested for grain, the clipping data are used only until March 1. The 
resulting forage yield minimum, maximum and modal values in Table 12 are 
lower than would normally be expected from the forage yield series pre-
sented in Table 7. 
The minimum prices used for wheat, grain sorghum, and cotton are 
the loan rates established for those crops for the 1980 season. This 
loan rate has historically been a reliable indicator of the lowest cash 
price that producers expect to receive. The modal value used for the 
price specificiations are the average cash prices received by producers 
for the current year. The maximum prices for wheat and grain sorghum 
are based on the release price of the Farmer Owned Grain Reserve. The 
maximum cotton price is based on the cash price in 1980. The minimum, 
maximum and modal prices for the forage enterprise are based on current 
expectations of the alfalfa hay price in Southwest Oklahoma. 
The following chapter outlines the risk management alternatives 
analyzed in this study. These alternatives are examined by specifying 
the mathematical formulas used to derive the payment benefits from 
particular program participation. 
TABLE 12. Price and Yield Distribution Parameters, Southwest Oklahoma 
Enterprise Unit MinimumA ModeB Maximumc 
Wheat Yield BU/ACRE o.oo 23.45 32.00 
Grain Sorghum BU/ACRE o.oo 43.45 54.00 
Yield 
Cotton Yield · LBS/ACRE o.oo 338.00 510.00 
Forage Yield LBS/ ACRE 500.00 1000.00 1800.00 
Wheat Price $/BU 3.08 3.80 4.75 
Grain Sorgaum $/BU 2.45 2.52 3.10 
Price 
Cotton Price $/LBS 0.484. 0.584 0.870 
Forage Price $/LBS 0.020 0.0325 0.050 
Ayield minimum values represent the lowest yield figures expected for 
Southwest Oklahoma. Price minimum for wheat, grain sorghum and cotton 
are the loan rates for each crop. The price minimum for the forage 
activity is the lowest expected cash price of alfalfa hay, Southwest 
Oklahoma. 
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BThe yield modal values are derived from frequency counts of historical 
data and the price modal values are the average cash prices received by 
producers in Southwest Oklahoma. 
CThe maximum yield values are from estimates based on historical data. 
The maximum price for wheat, grain sorghum and cotton are the release 
prices from the Farmer Owned Grain Reserve. The maximum price for the 
forage activity is the maximum alfalfa hay price expected for Southwest 
Oklahoma. 
CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
ALTERNATIVES 
The following is a detailed review of each commodity program and 
combination of programs analyzed in this study. To determine the direct 
payment made to the producer under varying alternatives, unique 
mathematical equations are specified for each program. These equations 
are the formulas utilized in the design framework of the model. An 
outline is also made of the assumptions, conditions, and requirements 
necessary to initiate a producer payment. Finally, a review is made of 
the assumptions concerning the proposed federal crop insurance program. 
This proposed FCI alternative is an attempt to determine the affects of 
recent legislation modifying the FCI program. 
To provide a base against which the various risk management 
alternatives may be compared, the farm firm is first simulated over the 
10-year planning horizon assuming no commodity or insurance programs are 
available to the producer. Then, participation in the deficiency 
payments program, disaster payments program, crop hail insurance on 
wheat and all-risk crop insurance program on wheat are evaluated. Table 
13 provides a summary of the main characteristics of these current 
programs. 
Various combinations of risk management alternatives are analyzed 
together. For example, deficiency and disaster programs are analyzed, 
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Source: Miller and Track 
Criteria 
Commodity program 
participants who receive 




participants who suffer 
crop losses. 
Losses or damages to 
growing crops caused by 
hail. 




Direct payments for 
Planted deficiency in price 
Acerage received below the 
target price. 
Planted Direct payments for 






. tion below 60% of 
normal farm yield 
Insurance to compen-
sate for crop losses 
resulting from hail. 
Insurance to compen-
sate for crop losses 












AThese are crops covered by the respective program for the purpose of this study. Other crops may be 
eligible for protection. 
.!::-
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then these two programs.are combined with crop hail insurance and then 
with the all-risk insurance program. -In addition, deficiency payments 
are·analyzed in combination with the all-risk insurance program. 
Proposed changes in the current FCI program will have an impact on the 
economic outcome of the FCI program. The proposed FCI program is 
analyzed alone and then compared to the existing program results. 
Finally, the proposed FCI program is analyzed in combination with the 
current deficiency program • 
. Deficiency Payment Program 
The deficiency payment program is designed to reduce the long-run 
risks inherent to farming by reducing price risks, a major cause of 
income variability. Another reason for the deficiency program is the 
compensation for losses due to publicly financed technological change. 
Since demand for agricultural products in inelastic, each advance in 
technology has decreased producers' income. By providing a direct 
payment program the magnitude and impact of this income loss is reduced 
(Miller and Sharples). 
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In this analysis, wheat, grain sorghum and cotton are covered under 
the deficiency program. Stochastic prices are generated from the 
triangular price distributions for year t and compared to the trended 
target price. If the trended stochastic price is less_than the target 
price, the deficiency payment is calculated and added to gross farm 




DPct = the disaster payment for the specified commodity in 
periodt. 
TPct = the trended target price for the specified commodity in 
period t. 
Pet = the actual stochastic price per acre for the specified 
commodity in period t. 
NFYc = the normal farm yield of the specified commodity. 
Act = the number of acres for harvest in period t. 
AFt = the allocation factor for period t. The allocation factor, 
specified for the simulation as one, is a ratio of the 
Normal Program Acreage to the National Acreage Harvested. 
The target prices are trended at six percent during the planning 
horizon. The initial target prices are $3.63 per bushel for wheat, 
$2.50 per bushel for grain sorghum and $.584 per pound for cotton. The 
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trended target prices for each commodity are presented in Table 14. The 
ASCS established yield in Jackson County for wheat, grain sorghum, and 
cotton is 22.8 bushels per acre, 46.4 bushels per acre and 472 pounds per 
acre, respectively. 
Disaster Payment Program 
The disaster payments program also reduces income variability by 
reducing the adverse effects of yield fluctuations. Payments are made to 
support income levels of agricultural producers who experience crop 
losses or are unable to plant crops because of a natural hazard. To 
represent this natural occurrence, stochastic yields generated from 
triangular distributions are tested against 60 percent of normal farm 
yield for wheat and grain sorghum. To determine disaster payments for 
cotton producers, stochastic yields are tested against 75 percent of farm 
yield and multiplied by one-third the target price. If the stochastic 
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Table 14. Trended Target Prices for Wheat, Grain Sorghum, and Cotton 
ENTERPRISE 
SIMULATION WHEAT GRAIN SORGHUM COTTON 
YEAR ($/bu) ($/bu) (¢/lb) 
1A 3.63 2.50 .584 
2 3.85 2.65 .619 
3 4.08 2.81 .656 
4 4.32 2.98 .696 
5 4.58 3.16 .737 
6 4.86 3.35 .782 
7 5.15 3.55 .828 
8 5.46 3.76 .878 
9 5.79 3.98 .931 
10 6.13 4.22 .987 
AThe initial target prices are 1980 target levels as specified by the 
USDA-ASCS. The preceding target prices have been trended at six 
percent annually. 
yields are less than the normal farm yield figure, a program payment is 
calculated and added to gross farm receipts. The disaster payment is 
computed using the following formula: 
( 2) 
where: 
DPPct = the disaster payment made for the specified commodity in 
period t. 
Act = the number of acres for harvest in period t. 
NFYc the normal farm yield of the specified commodity. 
Yet = the actual stochastic per acre yield for the specified 
commodity in period t. 
TPct = the trended target price for the specified commodity in 
period t. 
No production expenses are associated with participation in 
deficiency or disaster payment programs. Originally there was an 
indirect cost of participation due to the set aside requirement. For 
1981, no set aside program has been announced. This study analyzed the 
45 
effect such a requirement might have on the producer and returns to this 
farming operation. The impact of set aside acres is evaluated as part of 
scenarios containing deficiency and disaster programs. 
The disaster program required wheat producers to set aside 20 
percent and grain sorghum producers to set aside 10 percent of their 
normal harvested acres during the 1978 and 1979 crop years. For the 
organization of production used in this study, this represents 120 acres 
of wheat and 40 acres of grain sorghum. The cotton enterprise is not 
affected by a set aside program. The 160 acres that are set aside must 
be protected from erosion. The typical pattern for this area is to plant 
wheat, use it as a cover crop and graze it out. The costs of production 
(excluding harvesting costs) would not change, but the revised acreages 
would include 480 acres of wheat, 360 acres of grain sorghum, 400 acres 
of cotton and 480 acres of the forage activity. 
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Expenses.for the grazeout activity are based on a small grain 
grazeout budget for Southwest Oklahoma (Oklahoma Crop and Livestock 
Budgets, 1980) and include all of the costs associated with planting an 
acre of wheat.· The production cost per acre for the forage activity is 
$51.27. This figure is multiplied by 160 acres and is inflated at six 
percent annually. The added income is based on the weight gain in 
stocker animals from November until May. Assuming the animals weighed 
400 pounds in November and 700 pounds in May, the average weight is 550 
pounds. This figure is multiplied by $2.00 per hundredweight times six, 
the months grazed. This yields a $66.00 per acre charge for winter 
grazing. Assuming that each acre can support 1.2 head of cattle, the 
total income derived for winter grazing is $79.70 per acre. This per 
acre figure is multiplied by 160 acres and added to farm income. Over 
the years it is inflated at four percent per year. 
Crop Hail Insurance 
The erratic and uncertain nature of hail damage has enabled the 
private insurance industry to establish a well developed plan to provide 
insurance against crop hail losses. These losses are well suited for an 
insurance program because of the random nature of hail damage. Currently 
the private industry has a total liability coverage of $9 billion. 
Producers are paying $325 million annually with hail loss indemnities of 
about $200 million per year (Miller and Track). In 1974 the private 
industry covered 84.2 percent of the total losses paid that were caused 
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by hail damage (Miller and Walter). Thus, the private industry provides 
a substantial portion of total crop hail insurance. 
In Jackson County wheat, grain sorghum and cotton producers are all 
eligible for crop hail insurance. Because of the growing season, wheat 
is the only major enterprise insured frequently against hail ltosses. 
Thus, the crop hail insurance analysis is limited to the wheat enter-
prise. In determining the possibility of a crop loss, normal farm yield 
is first compared to the stochastic yield. Because the reasons for crop 
losses are numerous, it is assumed that three of every ten years of low 
yields is due to hail damage. If a crop loss is present, the model will 
calculate a hail insurance payment based on an approximate 30 percent 
probability level. When these conditions are present, a loss percentage 
is calculated using the following formula: 




LPwt = the wheat loss percentage in period t 
Ywt = the actual stochastic per acre yield for wheat in period t. 
NFYw = the normal farm yield for wheat 
The loss percentage is used in the following formula to derive the 
total insurance payment received by the producer for damages incurred by 
hail. 
IPwt = LPwt • Act • PCwt (4) 
where: 
IPwt = the total insurance payment for hail damages to the wheat 
crop in period t. 
LPwt = the wheat loss percentage in period t 
Awt = the number of wheat acres insured against hail damage in 
period t. 
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the expenses incurred in planting and fertilizing an acre of 
wheat in period t. Normally this is the per acre value of 
insurance liability selected by the producer. 
In this study, the cost of production represents the insurance 
coverage, as producers insure the expenses incurred in planting the wheat 
crop. Based on conversations with private insurance representatives in 
Jackson County, a premium rate of $8 per $100 of crop coverage is 
specified. 
Federal Crop Insurance 
The all-risk crop insurance alternative was based on specifications 
implemented by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). Federal 
crop insurance has been the major source of all risk insurance coverage 
available since 1948 (Miller and Trock). The program was developed by 
experimentation and was to be gradually expanded across the country. 
Because of this plan, one-half of the country and numerous-crops are 
without FCI coverage. Presently, Jackson County is limited to FCI 
covering only wheat enterprises. The initial portion of this analysis 
concerning the FCI program is limited to examining the current program. 
The model is designed to calculate payments for yields below the FCI 
guarantee level. If the actual stochastic wheat yield is below the FCI 
guarantee, a payment is calculated and added to gross receipts. The 
following formula is used to derive the program payments: 
(S) 
where: 
CIPt = the crop insurance payment for period t. 
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GLt = the per acre guarantee level as specified by the FCIC in 
period t. 
·Yet = the actual stochastic yield in period t. 
Act . - the number of acres covered by FCI in period t • 
PEct = the price elective chosen by the producer in period t. 
The current FCI program was evaluated with a per bushel FCI 
guarantee of SO percent. With the FCI average for wheat of 22.8 bushels 
per acre, the per bushel guarantee level is 11.~ bushels per acre. The 
price elective specified for this analysis is $3.00 per bushel.l 
The premium rates are based on the price elective selected and the 
per bushel guarantee the producer selects. For the 1980 crop year no 
premium subsidy is available to producers. The provisions for 1981 will 
permit subsidies of 30 percent. Both the 30 .Percent subsidy level and an 
alternative with no subsidy are computed at the 50 percent guarantee 
level. 
Alternative Combinations 
The deficiency and disaster payments program are evaluated in 
combination with the All-Risk Insurance or the Crop Hail Insurance. 
Deficiency and disaster payment programs are evaluated assuming 
compliance with the set aside requirement. The scenario, including 
deficiency and disaster payments and All-Risk Insurance, involves no 
1The ASCS established yield and the FCIC average yield are assumed 
to be equal based on conversations with Deloise Brown, Jackson County 
FCIC Representative. Specifying lower FCIC average yields could vary the 
results presented in this study. The yield series used in this study is 
based on harvested acre yields while the FCIC estimates crop coverage and 
premium payments on planted acreage. Historically planted acre yields 
are approximately 15 percent lower than harvested acre yields. 
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government subsidy and a 50 percent guarantee level. A scenario, 
including deficiency and disaster payments and hail insurance, is also 
evah,tated. Various combinations of deficiency and All-Risk Insurance are 
examined to evaluate different levels of subsidy and guarantee levels. 
Proposed Federal Crop Insurance 
The final analysis is based on proposed changes in the FCI program 
for Jackson County. As mentioned, the 1980 FCI program analyzed is 
limited to wheat production. The program for the 1981 crop year is 
expected to extend coverage to include wheat, grain sorghum and cotton. 
The guarantee options will cover 50, 65 and 75 percent of the average 
farm yield established by the FCIC. The price electives used in this 
analysis for wheat, grain sorghum and cotton are $3.00 per bushel, $2.00 
per bushel, and $0.45 per pound, respectively. The current FCI program 
has no provision for premium subsidies. The 1981 FCI program will have a 
full 30 percent government subsidy for the 50 and 65 percent guarantee 
levels. If the producer chooses the 75 percent guarantee level, the 
subsidy level is equal to the 30 percent premium associated with the 65 
percent guarantee level. The enterprise production cost and premium cost 
per acre for participation in the FCI program are presented in Table 15. 
The premium expenses given for grain sorghum and cotton are preliminary 
estimates of the anticipated FCI program costs for Jackson County 
(Walter). The FCI premium expense for the wheat enterprise is the actual 
1980 cost figures, based on an FCIC average farm yield of 22.8 bushels 
per acre. 
The actual average yields used by the FCIC to derive guarantee 
levels is presently unknown for grain sorghum and cotton. The wheat 
Table 15. Enterprise Production Cost and Premium Expense Per Acre for 
Participation in the 1981 FCI Program, Jackson County, 
Oklahoma 
Enterprise 
Cost Wheat Grain Sorghum Cotton 
Production CostA (dollars/acre) $72.07 $28.46 $144.16 
Premium CostB .(dollars/acre): 
so Percent Guarantee 5.30 2.70 4.10 
65 Percent Guarantee 7.40 4.30 6.50 
75 Percent Guarantee 8.73 5.90 9.00 
Premium Cost with a 30 Percent 
Subsidy (dollars/acre): 
50 Percent Guarantee 3.71 1.89 2.87 
65 Percent Guarantee 5.18 3.01 4.55 
75 Percent Guarantee 6.51 4.61 7.05 
5.1 
AProduction costs are derived from enterprise budgets for Southwest 
Oklahoma, Oklahoma Crop and Livestock Budgets. (Production cost compo-
nents include operating inputs, annual operating capital, taxes, 
insurance and labor.) 
BThe grain sorghum and cotton premium expenses are preliminary esti-
mates obtained from Alan S. Walter, Staff Economist, FCIC, Kansas City, 
Missouri. The wheat premium expenses are actual figures based on an 
average FCIC county yield. These were obtained from Deloise Brown, 
Jackson County, FCIC, Altus, Oklahoma. 
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guarantee levels are actual figures obtained from the Jackson County FCIC 
office (Brown). Two sets of estimated yields for ·grain sorghum and 
cotton are utilized to analyze the possibility of high or lo~ established 
average yield levels. These guarantee estimates are combined with the 
actual wheat levels to simulate the impacts of implementing the proposed 
1981 FCI program. The guarantee levels are presented in Table 16. 
The following chapter outlines the results of current and proposed 
commodity programs. The programs are compared using the mean, minimum, 
maximum, coefficient of variation in net worth and the number of 
bankrupt iterations. The expenses incurred by the producer and the 
government are presented for·various yield levels. 
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Table 16. FCI Guarantee Levels for Wheat, Grain Sorghum, and Cotton 
LOW ESTIMATED FCI AVERAGE YIELDS: 
50 Percent Guarantee 
65 Percent Guarantee 
75 Percent Guarantee 
HIGH ESTIMATED FCI AVERAGE YIELDS: 
50 Percent Guarantee 
65 Percent Guarantee 


























Awheat guarantee levels are actual figures obtained from Deloise Brown, 
Jackson County FCIC Office. The grain sorghum and cotton estimates were 
obtained from Alan S. Walter, Staff. Economist, FCIC, Kansas City, 
Missouri. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS OF COMMODITY 
PROGRAM EVALUATION 
Each of the alternatives evaluated involved a 10-year simulation 
run replicated 100 times. Portions of the results for the current 
programs are summarized in Table 17 and Table 18. These results include 
the mean, minimum and maximum ending net worth, and coefficient of 
variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) of ending net worth. 
The number of bankruptcies occurring during the 100 iterations is also 
presented. 
Current Program Results 
Base Run 
The base run simulates the growth of the farm firm without any type 
of public or private risk management program. At the end of the 10-year 
period, the farm firm has a mean ending net worth of $451,500, and there 
are 23 bankruptcies. The bankruptcy figure indicates that in 23 of the 
100 iterations, or 23 percent of the time, percent equity dropped below 
30 percent, the firm was unable to meet cash needs and a bankruptcy 
occurred. The base situation is sensitive to added debt. That is, as 




TABLE 17. Ending Net Worth for the Current Program Alternatives 
I 
I 
ENDING NET WORTH ($000) 
I 
BANK-
Type of Alternative MEAN MIN MAX RANGE c.v. (%) RUPTCIES 
I No Commodity Program 451.5 152.9 697.0 544.1 26.1 23 
I 
Deficiency Payments Program: 
I 
No set aside 536.8 305.7 739.4 433.7 20.2 12 
I 
Set aside requirement 506.0 302.1 711.0 408.9 20.5 15 
I 
Disaster Payments Program: 
No set aside 673.3 440.4 848.4 408.0 12.6 0 
Set aside requirement 652.7 418.2 826.1 407.9 13.0 0 
All Risk Insurance Program: 
No government subsidy at the 50% FCI 432.9 128.4 686.0 557.6 27.6 23 
guarantee 
30% government subsidy at the 50% FCI 441.5 137.1 691.1 554.0 26.5 23 
guarantee 
Crop-Hail Insurance Program: 449.4 159.4 676.1 516.7 25.2 21 
Deficiency and Disaster Programs: 
No set aside 734.6 534.7 877.2 342.5 9.3 0 
Set aside requirement 713.0 512.1 852.7 340.7 9.6 0 
Ln 
Ln 
TABLE 17. (Continued) 
ENDING NET WORTH ($000) 
Type of Alternative MEAN MIN MAX RANGE 
Deficiency, Disaster and All Risk Insurance: 
No government subsidy 724.3 518.4 871.0 352.7 










TABLE 18. Ending Net Worth for the Current Deficiency and FCI Program 
ENDING NET WORTH ($000) 
Type of Alternative MEAN MIN MAX 
Deficiency and All Risk Insurance (wheat only) 
50% FCI guarantee with no subsidy 520.7 310.1 730.3 
Set aside requirement 493.1 309.8 703.0 
50% FCI guarantee with 30% subsidy 527.6 304.1 734.9 
Set aside requirement 498.5 307.4 706.8 
50% FCI guarantee with 100% subsidy 543.7 302.2 745.4 
65% FCI guarantee with 30% subsidy 529.8 304.2 734.4 
75% FCI guarantee with eligible subsidy 534.1 301.4 737.3 




















Deficiency Payment Program 
The addition of the deficiency payment program, which is designed 
to r~duce the adverse effects of price variability, increases mean 
ending net worth from $451,500 to $536,800, a substantial increase. In 
addition, the number of bankruptcies was reduced by about SO percent to 
12. The coefficient of variation decreases from 26.1 to 20.2 percent. 
Thus, for this individual farming operation the goals of the deficiency 
program parallel the results. The program increased the expected ending 
net worth and reduced the probability of financial disaster for the low 
equity producer. 
The addition of the set aside program as a requirement for 
participation in the deficiency payment program reduces the mean ending 
net worth to $506,000 and increases the number of bankruptcies to 15. 
Even with the indirect costs associated with participation in the set 
aside program, the producer would generally favor the deficiency program 
with set aside over the base run with no commodity programs at all. 
Disaster Payment Program 
The disaster payments program, when analyzed alone, is the single 
most favorable program to the producer. There are significant increases 
in the ending net worth position over both the base run and the 
deficiency payments program. Expected ending net worth totals $673,300 
and no bankruptcies occur. This represents a 49 percent increase in 
the mean net worth over the base run. The range in ending net worth is 
decreased by $136,100. Adding a set aside requirement to the disaster 
program again reduces the magnitude of the improvement over the base run. 
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Even with the reduction caused by the set aside program, disaster pay-
ments represent a substantial improvement over the base run. The number 
of bankruptcies remains zero with the addition of the set aside require-
ment. Disaster payments reduce substantially the effects of yield varia-
bility for the producer and significantly increase the chance of survi-
val. The coefficient of variation associated with net worth is 12.6 per-
cent under disaster programs, compared to 26.1 percent in the base run. 
It would clearly be beneficial for the producer to participate in the 
disaster payments program even if compliance with aset aside requirement 
is necessary. 
All Risk Crop Insurance 
The All Risk Insurance program does not yield results that are as 
favorable to the producer as those of the deficiency and disaster pay-
ments program. For the alternatives containing only all risk insurance, 
two levels of government subsidy are evaluated at the 50 percent guaran-
tee level. These subsidy levels, 30 percent and no subsidy, both result 
in a less favorable net worth position than the base run at the end of 
10-year simulation. The mean, maximum and minimum are all reduced and 
the range in ending net worth increases. The coefficient of variation 
for the alternative with no subsidy increases to 27.6 percent compared to 
26.1 percent in the base run. The number of bankruptcies remains 
constant at 23. 
A 30 percent subsidy with a 50 percent guarantee shows a favorable 
mean net worth level ($441,500) compared to the FCI program with no 
subsidy ($432,900). This subsidy level also reduces the coefficient of 
variation to 26.5 percent. The increase in net worth level for the 
subsidy program is small in comparison to the disaster payments 
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program and the deficiency payments program. Even if a set aside 
requirement is imposed on the deficiency and disaster programs, they 
still yield more favorable results than all the risk insurance program. 
If the producer were faced with a choice of no program or all risk 
insurance with a subsidy, he would be better off in the long run to 
assume the yield risks himself because ending net worth is higher with no 
commodity programs or insurance. 
Crop Hail Insurance 
The crop hail insurance program which includes only wheat hail 
insurance coverage, yields ending net worth levels that are not as 
favorable as the base run which has no commodity or insurance programs. 
While the net worth is lower for the insurance program, the number of 
bankruptcies decreased from 23 to 21, compared to the base run. 
Results for the wheat hail insurance alternative are low partly 
because the premium costs are incurred every year. This assumption may 
not represent the actions of a typical producer because most do not 
purchase wheat hail insurance every year. The model forces this 
constraint on the analysis because it is limited to either purchasing 
insurance every year or not at all. While expenses are incurred every 
year, the chance of income from insurance proceeds is limited to about 
three out of ten years. Thus, if the producer does participate in the 
wheat hail insurance program every year, these results suggest the 
producer would be worse off than if he never participated. 
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Deficiency and Disaster Payments 
The three alternatives which include disaster and deficiency 
payments all show a greatly enhanced position compared to the base run. 
These combinations reduce risk and $how more firm growth than any of the 
programs analyzed singularly. When deficiency and disaster programs are 
combined, mean ending net worth is $734,600 and bankruptcies are reduced 
to zero. Because disaster payments alone reduce the likelihood of firm 
failure to zero, any combination of other programs with disaster 
payments is likely to generate the same result. 
The alternative of deficiency, disaster, and crop hail insurance 
has a mean net worth of $732,600 and a 9.0 percent coefficient of 
variation. The range in net worth ($311,000) is lower than any other 
alternative. A lower net worth occurs when deficiency and disaster 
payments are combined with the all risk insurance program. Any of these 
combinations greatly increases the chance of firm survival. 
Deficiency Payments and Federal Crop Insurance 
This portion of the analysis deals with combinations of deficiency 
payments and all risk insurance on wheat. The SO percent of normal farm 
yield level is run with all subsidy levels. The set aside requirements 
are evaluated on alternatives with no subsidy and with the 30 percent 
subsidy. 
Results on Table 18 indicate that the SO percent yield guarantee 
with the premium subsidized 100 percent is more favorable for the 
producer. Mean net worth totals $S43,700 and nine bankruptcies occur. 
At the same yield guarantee level but without the premium subsidy, the 
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mean net worth is only $520,700 and 16 bankruptcies occur. At the 
30 percent subsidy level, increasing the yield guarantee from 50 perent 
to 65 percent to 75 percent increase ending mean net worth from $527,600 
to $534,100 and bankruptcies decline from 13 to 10. Thus, the percent 
yield guarantee appears to have relatively little impact on the mean 
ending net worth and the probability of firm survival. 
Proposed Program Results 
All Risk Insurance Program 
The results for the proposed 1981 FCI program are presented in 
Table 19. The results indicate that the new program will be more 
beneficial to producers than the existing FCI program which is limited to 
wheat production. The mean net worth for this farm situation participa-
ting in the current FCI program at the 50 percent guarantee level is 
$432,900 (Table 17). This is a smaller mean net worth than results for 
the low range 50 percent guarantee level under the proposed FCI program 
which had a mean net worth of $445,700. Bankruptcies occurred 23 times 
under the current program and 21 times under the proposed program. By 
choosing to participate at the 75 percent guarantee level the producer 
would further reduce the possibility of bankruptcy. In this scenario, 
bankruptcies are reduced to six and mean net worth increases to 
$474,000. 
The possibility of higher guarantee levels is favorable to the 
producer who participates in the proposed FCI program. The high 75 
percent guarantee level has a mean net worth of $492,700. This 
represents an $18,700 increase in mean net worth over the low 75 percent 
TABLE 19. Ending Net Worth of the Proposed 1981 FCI Program for Wheat, Grain Sorghum, and Cot~on 
ENDING NET WORTH ($000) 
Alternative MEAN MIN MAX RANGE c.v. (%) 
Proposed All Risk Crop Insurance 
(All Crops with a Low FCI Average Farm 
Yield) 
50% FCI guarantee with a 30% subsidy 445.7 167.6 685.4 517.8 24.7 
65% FCI guarantee with a 30% subsidy 462.9 197.1 691.1 494.0 22.1 
7 5% FCI guarantee with the eligible . 
subsidy 474.0 301.3 700.9 400.0 20.8 
Proposed All Risk Crop Insurance 
(All Crops with a High FCI Average Farm 
Yield) 
50% FCI guarantee with a 30% subsidy 452.3 175.3 689.3 514.0 23.9 
65% FCI guarantee with a 30% subsidy 475.4 306.0 701.4 395.4 ' 21.2 
75% FCI guarantee with the eligible 












guarantee level. When the high 75 percent guarantee level is imple-
mented, bankruptcies are decreased to three. This high and low guarantee 
classification pertains to the FCIC yield estimates for grain sorghum and 
cotton. The results indicate an overclassification or underclassifi-
cation of the FCIC yield estimates has a significant impact on firm 
growth and survival rate. In this instance, the farm manager who has a 
higher.yield classifiction, compared to a lower estimate, will derive 
greater benefits from the proposed FCI program. As the guarantee levels 
increase, the ending net worth position improves and bankruptcies 
decrease. 
A comparison of the high 65 percent level to the base run reveals 
that mean net worth increased from $451,500 (Table 17) to $475,400 (Table 
19). The number of bankruptcies for the 65 percent guarantee is eight 
while the base run has 23. The variance in net worth decreases from 26.1 
percent to 21.2 percent for the base run and the high 65 percent level, 
respectively. 
Deficiency and Proposed Federal Crop Insurance 
The 1981 FCI program is analyzed in combination with the current 
deficiency payments program to determine the potential impacts of 
eliminating the disaster payments program. The results reveal the 
deficiency and proposed FCI program do not provide the income support 
that is evident with the disaster program. 
Results for the deficiency and proposed FCI program are presented 
in Table 20. These results show that the added grain sorghum and cotton 
coverage do not substantially increase net worth compared to the 
existing deficiency and FCI program. The mean net worth for the 50 
TABLE 20. Ending Net Worth of the Deficiency and Proposed FCI Program for Wheat, Grain Sorghum, and Cotton 
ENDING NET WORTH ($000) 
BANK-
ALTERNATIVE MEAN MIN MAX RANGE c.v. (%) RUPTCIES 
Deficiency and Proposed All Risk Insurance: 
(All Crops With a Low FCI Average Farm Yield) 
50% FCI guarantee with no subsidy: 517.9 306.6 720.3 413.7 20.1 8 
Set aside requirement 490.3 303.1 693.5 390.4 20.1 11 
50% FCI guarantee with 30% subsidy: 531.3 309.9 729.0 419.1 19.4 7 
Set aside Requirement 501.7 303.7 701.5 397.8 19.9 8 
50% FCI guarantee with 100% subsidy 561.9 310.9 748.5 437.6 18.0 3 
65% FCI guarantee with 30% subsidy 548.1 310.9 733.3 422.4 17.6 2 
75% FCI guarantee with the eligible subsidy 560.8 322.5 741.5 419.0 16.0 0 
Deficiency and Propose4 All Risk Insurance: 
(All Crops With a High FCI Average Farm Yield) 
50% FCI guarantee with no subsidy 524.2 304.4 724.0 419.0 19.6 7 
Set aside requirement 496.0 303.2 697.1 393.9 19.9 9 
50% FCI guarantee with 30% subsidy 537.6 306.9 732.6 425.8 18.9 6 
Set aside requirement 507.6 302.8 705.1 402.2 19.5 7 
0\ 
ll1 
TABLE 20. (Continued) 
ALTERNATIVE MEAN 
50% FCI guarantee with 100% subsidy 568.2 
65% FCI guarantee with 30% subsidy 561.1 
75% FCI guarantee with the eligible subsidy 580.2 
ENDING NET WORTH ($000) 
MIN MAX RANGE 
315.4 752.1 436.7 
315.5 742.2 426.6 












percent guarantee with a 30 percent subsidy is $531,300 (Table 20), 
compared to $527,600 (Table 18) for the program containing wheat only. 
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As the FCI guarantees increase, an increase in firm growth can be seen. 
The lower range 75 percent guarantee has a mean net worth of $560,800 
(Table 20) compared to $534,100 (Table 18) with the current program. The 
added coverage provided by the proposed FCI program does increase the 
chance of firm survival. Comparing the proposed FCI program and the 
current program at the 75 percent level reveals that bankruptcies 
decrease from 10 (Table 18) to zero (Table 20). 
The deficiency and proposed FCI program analyzed with the higher FCI 
guarantee levels show relatively small impacts on the levels of firm 
growth or chance of firm survival compared to the lower guarantee. The 
high range 50 percent guarantee level had a $524,200 (Table 20) mean net 
worth compared to $517,900 (Table 20) for the same alternative at the low 
guarantee level. Bankruptcies declined from 8 to 7 for the low and high 
yield levels, respectively. The bankruptcies at the 65 percent guarantee 
level with 30 percent subsidy remained constant at two for both sets of 
guarantee levels. These results indicate that the level of yield 
guarantees has little impact on the economic viability of this producer 
choosing to participate in the deficiency and the proposed FCI program. 
Comparing the deficiency and proposed FCI program to the base run 
reveals significant increases in net worth and chance of firm survival. 
The lowest mean net worth with high FCI guarantee is the 50% guarantee 
with no subsidy and set aside acreage. This scenario has a mean net 
worth of $496,000 (Table 20) compared to the base run with $451,500 
(Table 17). Bankruptcies occurred 23 times in the base run and 
decreased to nine with the deficiency and FCI program. · These significant 
improvements indicate that producers might favor the deficiency and 
proposed 1981 FCI program over no program involvement. 
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Comparing the deficiency and proposed FCI ·program to the base run 
reveals significant increases in net worth and chance of firm survival. 
The lowest mean net worth with high FCI guarantee is the 50% guarantee 
with rio subsidy and set aside. acreage. This scenario has a mean net 
worth of $496,000 (Table 20) compared to the base run with $451,500 
(Table 17). Bankruptcies occurred 23 times in the base run and decreased 
to nine with the deficiency and FCI program. These significant 
improvements indicate that producers might favor the deficiency and 
proposed 1981 FCI program over no program involvement. 
The disaster and the combination of disaster and deficiency program 
both show improved financial position over the deficiency and 1981 FCI 
program. The best results for the later alternative is the. 75 percent 
guarantee level with a mean net worth of $580,200 (Table 20). This is a 
decline in mean net worth of $93,100 and $154,400 for the disaster and 
combined disaster and deficiency program, respectively. There are no 
bankruptcies for any of the alternatives. The added premium cost 
associated with the FCI program decreases economic growth when comparing 
the disaster program or the disaster and deficiency program. 
Government Costs 
Current Programs 
The benefits and costs of providing assistance to agricultural 
producers is a recent topic of debate. The social costs and benefits 
provided by commodity programs are largely unmeasured because of the 
difficulty in establishing an appropriate scale of assessment. The 
actual costs and benefits for providing these programs can be 
determined by estimating the payments made to producers and the 
government costs associated with those payments. 
In an attempt to estimate the costs and payments made by the 
government a series of .various yield levels is examined. This concept 
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of various yield levels is used because the payments made by the 
government will vary with selected·yields. Each of these yield levels is 
assigned a probability level based on the stochastic yields generated by 
the model. A summation of the government cost per acre multiplied by the 
probability level for each yield will determine the expected annual 
government ~ost over time. This expected net cost represents the total 
government expenditure per acre, based on the yield probability 
distribution. The current government cost and the estimated net 
government cost for providing this producer with crop coverage under the 
DPP and the FCI program is presented in Table 21 and Table 22, 
respectively. Various wheat, grain sorghum, and cotton yields are 
presented in Table 21 with the corresponding government outlay per 
acre. These are direct payments per acre that the producer would 
receive for the specified yield. The direct payments specified for 
wheat and grain sorghum are based on equation (2) of Chapter III. The 
disaster payments made to cotton producers is derived by the same 
equation but actual yields are tested against 75 percent of normal farm 
yield times one-third the cotton target price. 
The producer who has a wheat yield of zero would receive $24.83 per 
acre in a direct payment (Table 21). If he has a wheat yield of 15 
bushels per acre he is not eligible for a payment due to the higher 
TABLE 21. Government Cost Per Acre of Selected Yields Under the Current Disaster Payments 
Program, Jackson County, Oklahoma 
PROGRAM 
Probability Level 
Disaster Payment - Wheat 
Producer Cost 
Government Cost Per Acre 
Probability Level 
Disaster Payment - Grain Sorghum 
Producer Cost 
Government Cost Per Acre 
Probability Level 
Disaster Payment - Cotton 
Producer Cost 
Government Cost Per Acre 
SPECIFIED YIELD LEVELS 
WHEAT YIELD LEVEL (BU./ACRE) 
0 5 10 15 20 
(. 027) (.082) (. 091) (.218) (. 582) 
$ 24.83 $15.75 $ 6.68 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
24.83 15.75 6.68. 0 0 
GRAIN SORGHUM YIELD LEVEL (BU./ACRE) 
0 10 20 30 40 


















COTTON YIELD LEVEL (lbs./ACRE) 
100 200 300 
(.145) (.246) (. 327) 
$74.17 $44.97 $15.77 
0 0 0 

















TABLE 22. Government Cost or Surplus Per Acre Under the Current Federal Crop Insurance 
Program, Jackson County, Oklahoma 
WHEAT YIELD LEVEL (BU./ACRE) 
ALL RISK CROP INSURANCE 0 5 10 15 20 
Probability Level ( .027) (. 082) (. 091) (.218) (.582) 
50% Guarantee (11.4 bu./acre) $34.20 $19.20 $ 4.20 $ 0 $ 0 
Premium Rate - .no subsidy 5.30 5~30 5.30 5.30 5.30 
Government (Cost)/Surplus Per Acre (28.90) (13. 90) 1.10 5.30 5.30 
65% Guarantee (14.8 bu./acre) $44.40 $29.40 $14.40 $ 0 $ 0 
Premium Rate - no subsidy 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 7.40 
Government (Cost)/Surplus Per Acre (37.00) (22.00) (7.00) 7.40 7.40 
75% Guarantee (17.1 bu./acre) . $51.30 $36.30 $21.30 $6.30 $ 0 
Premium Rate - no subsidy 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 8.73 








yield. The estimated net government cost for providing this coverage is 
$2.57 per acre. The farmer who has a grain sorghum yield of 10 bushels 
per acre would receive $22.30 per acre;. At the 30 bushel per acre level 
he would no longer receive payments. The government cost for providing 
grain sorghum coverage is $4.15 per acre. The cotton producer who has a 
zero yield is eligible for a direct payment of $103.37. If cotton yield . 
is 300 pounds per acre the payment is $15.77 per acre. The cotton 
coverage provided by the DPP has the highest estimated government 
expenditure of $30.70 per acre. 
Table 22 presents the government cost or surplus from participating 
in the current FCI program limited to wheat producers in Jackson 
County. Payments made to producers are based on equation (5) of Chapter 
III. If the farmer is enrolled at the 50 percent guarantee level and has 
a zero yield the direct payment minus premium expenses is $28.90 
per acre. If the producer has a wheat yield of 20 bushels per acre the 
cost is the premium expenses incurred because he is not eligible for a 
payment due to the high yield. The payments for low yields increase as 
the guarantee level increases. At the five bushel per acre yield the 
payments are $13.90, $22.00, and $27.57 per acre for guarantee levels of 
50, 65, and 75 percent, respectively. 
The producer who has a yield of 2·0 bushels per acre of wheat will 
not be eligible for a payment under either 50 or 75 percent guarantee •. 
Coverage under the 50 percent level will cost the producer $5.30 per acre 
and the 75 percent level will cost $8.73 per acre. 
The estimated net government surplus under the current FCI program 
is $2.42, $2.48, and $1 •. 06 per acre fat;" the 50, 65, and 75 percent 
guarantee level, respectively. Based on the probabilities as determined 
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by the stochastic yield series, the government has a per acre surplus for 
every FCI yield guarantee. This indicates the current FCI program, 
compared to the disaster payments program, provides the government with a 
more cost effective risk management program. 
Premium costs under FCI is a major reason that the DPP provides 
greater financial stability than the FCI program. The producer incurs no 
cost when participating in the DPP. The only costs the government incur 
are fixed costs and administrative costs under the DPP when yields are 
high. The government would receive payments from producers when 
yields are above the guarantee levels under the FCI program. 
Proposed Program 
This analysis evaluates the government cost per acre for the 
proposed FCI program with extended crop coverage to include wheat, grain 
sorghum, and cotton. The government cost for each enterprise with the 
expected program requirements are presented in Tables 23, 24, and 25. 
The effects of changes in the FCI program can be seen by comparing 
the proposed program for wheat (Table 23) and the existing FCI program 
(Table 22). The only difference in the government cost is the amount 
represented by the 30 percent subsidy. The government costs will be 
more under the proposed plan for low yields because producers will be 
paying less for coverage. For a 50 percent guarantee under the proposed 
program the government cost per acre will be $15.49 for a five bushel 
yield. The cost under the current plan for the same coverage would be 
$13.90 (Table 22) per acre. The effects of the premium subsidy under the 
proposed FCI program is also shown on the net government surplus. 
Comparing Table 22 and 23 reveals the surplus is reduced for the 50 and 
TABLE 23. Government Cost or Surplus Per Acre Under the Pr~posed Federal Crop Insurance Program for 
Wheat, Jackson County, Oklahoma 
WHEAT YIELD LEVEL (BU./ACRE) 
NET GOVERNMENT 
PROPOSED ALL RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM 0 5 10 15 20 (COST)/SURPLUS 
Probability Level (. 027) (.082) (.091) (. 218) (.582) 
50% Guarantee (11.4 bu./acre) $34.20 $19.20 $ 4.20 $ 0 $ 0 
Premium Rate 30% subsidy 3. 71 3.71 3.71 3. 71 3.71 
Government (Cost)/Surplus Per Acre (30.49) (15. 49) (.49) 3.71 3. 71 $ • 83 
65% Guarantee (14.8 bu./acre) $44.40 $29.40 $14.40 $ 0 $ 0 
Premium Rate 30% subsidy 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 
Government (Cost)/Surplus Per Acre (39.22) (24.22) (9.22) 5.18 5.18 $ • 26 
75% Guarantee ((17.1 bu./acre) $51.30 $36.30 $21.30 $6.30 $ 0 
Producer Cost - Eligible subsidy 6.51 6.51 6o51 6.51 6.51 
Government (Cost)/Surplus Per Acre (44.79) (29.79) (14.79) -:-IT 6.51 $1.16 
-.1 
+:-
TABLE 24. Government Cost or Surplus Per Acre Under the Proposed Federal Crop Insurance Program for 
Grain Sorghum, Jackson County, Oklahoma 
GRAIN SORGHUM YIELD LEVEL (BU./ACRE) 
NET GOVERNMENT 
PROPOSED ALL RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM 0 10 20 30 40 . (COST)/ SURPLUS 
Probability Level (.009) I (.100) (.164) (.191) (.536) 
50% Guarantee (20 bu/acre) $50.00 $25.00 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 
Producer Cost - 30% subsidy 1.89 1.89 1.89 1. 89 1. 89 
Government (Cost)/Surplus Per Acre (48.11) (23.11) 1.89 1.89 1.89 $(1. 06) 
65% Guarantee (26 bu./acre) $65.00 $40.00 $15.00 $ 0 $ 0 
Producer Cost - 30% subsidy 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 
Government (Cost)/Surplus Per Acre (61.99) (36.99) (11. 99) 3.01 3.01 $(4.04) 
75% Guarantee (30 bu./acre) $75.00 $50.00 $25.00 $ 0 $ 0 
Producer Cost - Eligible subsidy 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 
Government (Cost)/Surplus Per Acre (70. 39) (45.39) (20.39) 4.61 4.61 $(5.17) 
'-J 
t,n 
TABLE 25. Government Cost or Surplus Per Acre Under the Proposed Federal Crop Insurance Program 
for Cotton, Jackson County, Oklahoma 
COTTON YIELD LEVEL (BU./ACRE) 
NET GOVERNMENT 
PROPOSED ALL RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM 0 100 200 300 400 (COST)/SURPLUS 
Probability Level (.036) (.145) (.246) (. 327) (.246) 
50% Guarantee (204 pounds/acre) $91.80 $46.80 $ 1.80 $ 0 $ 0 
Producer Cost - 30% subsidy 2.87 2.87 2.87 2.87 2.87 
Government (Cost)/Surplus Per Acre (88.93). (43.93) 1.07 2.87 2.87 $ (7.66) 
65% Guarantee (265 pounds/acre) $119.25 $74.25 $29.25 $ 0 $ 0 
Producer Cost - 30% subsidy 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 
Government (Cost)/Surplus Per Acre ( 114. 70) (69.70) ( 24. 70) 4.55 4. 55 $(17.70) 
75% Guarantee (305 pounds/acre) $137.25 $92.25 $47.25 $2.25 $ 0 
Producer Cost - Eligible subsidy 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 7.05 
Government (Cost)/Surplus Per Acre (130. 20) (85.20) (40.20) 4.80 7.05 . $( 23. 63) 
'-l 
0\ 
65 percent guarantee level, while the 75 percent level results in a 
government cost. 
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The government costs for extending the program to grain sorghum and 
cotton are presented in Table 24 and_25, respectively. When compared to 
the DPP (Table 21), these results reveal government costs to be greater 
under the proposed FCI plan for low yields at high guarantee levels. The 
cost to the government for providing the DPP with a grain sorghum yield 
of 10 is $22.30 (Table 21). The same yield level with the proposed FCI 
program at the 75 percent guarantee level would cost the government 
$45.39. This is a large difference and indicates that very low yields 
within an area of heavy FCI coverage would be a very costly program for 
the government. For the same area with high yields there would be a 
large government surplus because no payments would be made. Considering 
these low and high yields as extremes, a comparison of probability levels 
in relation to net government cost reveals the proposed FCI program is 
relatively equal to the DPP. The net government cost for grain sorghum 
coverage under the DPP is $4.15 (Table 21) and the cost under the 
proposed FCI program at the 65 percent guarantee level is $4.04 (Table 
24). 
The proposed FCI program will be more costly for the government 
because of the premium subsidy. When yields are low the net payments 
will be larger because the producer is paying less for coverage. As the 
yields increase and producers become ineligible for payments the cash 
premium the government receives are also reduced by the lower cost 
producers are paying for coverage. 
The government cost under the current FCI program for a producer 
who has a zero wheat yield at the 50 percent guarantee level is $28.90 
78 
(Table 22). The same coverage and yield under the proposed program is 
$30.49 (Table 23). This represents an increased cost of 5. 5 percent .• 
Examining the same 50 percent guarantee level for the current and 
proposed FCI program with a 20 bushel per acre yield reveals different 
results. The government would receive $5.30 (Table 22) per acre in 
premium payments from the producer under the current program. These 
receipts would be reduced to $3.71 (Table 23) per acre under the proposed 
program. This is a reduction in receipts of 30 percent. The government 
will receive less surplus per acre as yields increase under the proposed 
program. 
As would be expected with the premium subsidy, the costs are greater 
for the government with the proposed FCI program. The producer will 
receive greater net payments as the premium costs are reduced. Producers 
will be in a less favorable position by participating the FCI program at 
.higher yields. In cases of severe and wide spread natural disasters.the 
government will make large expenditures under the FCI program especially 
with a premium subsidy to producers. If yields are high enough to 
prohibit producer payments the FCI program will be cost beneficial to the 
government. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The agricultural sector of the U.S. economy has a long history of 
unstable and variable prices and yields. Numerous acts of nature, such 
as drought, pestilence, and disease affect yield levels and are a major 
cause of variable yields. Foreign,demand, domestic demand, and total 
world crop production have significant roles in widely fluctuating crop 
prices. These unstable prices and yields create a unique and 
challenging environment when trying to stabilize the income of 
agricultural producers. This attempt at income stabilization is the 
primary reason for the existence of public and private commodity 
programs. 
These commodity programs are the subject of recent debate 
concerning the effects of commodity programs on the U.S. Treasury, the 
structural framework of American agriculture, and the fair and equitable 
distribution of program benefits among agricultural producers. The 
major purpose of this study is to evaluate the various impacts of 
alternative commodity programs~ A detailed examination is made of 
alternative risk management programs and their impact on the firm growth 
and survival rate of a simulated farming scenario. 
To analyze these program impacts, a simulation model in a 
stochastic price and yield environment is combined with alternative 
commodity programs. The simulation model calculates balance sheet 
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information, net cash flow, and the probability of farm survival for 
each year on the planning horizon. Combined with alternative risk 
managment programs, comparisons of the adequacy and effectiveness of 
current and proposed government and private crop programs can be made at 
the farm level. 
The farm scenario selected is typical for Southwestern Oklahoma and 
represents a full time farming operation. The net worth for this farm 
operator is approximately $311,000, with a 30 percent equity ratio. 
This low beginning equity percentage indicates a limited risk bearing 
ability and exposes the producer to a high chance of farm failure 
without income stabilization. 
The initial data specified for the model includes the beginning 
farm financial situation, the organization of production, the proposed 
investment information and the risk management alternative to be 
analyzed. To simulate the variable nature of the agriculture sector in 
regards to prices and yields, a set of random and triangularly 
distributed prices and yields is calculated. The requirements, such as 
target prices, normal farm yield, and cost of participation, where 
appropriate, is specified for each commodity program analyzed. This 
initial scenario, once established, is simulated over a 10 year planning 
horizon with 100 iterations. 
The commodity programs analyzed in this study represent the major 
public and private attempts to provide income stability to agricultural 
producers. To provide a base for comparisons of alternative risk 
managment decisions, the farming scenario is simulated assuming no 
commodity programs are available to the producer. This initial position 
simulates the farm firm growth and chance of firm survival without any 
type of subsidy or government payment. 
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The four major commodity programs now in existence, deficiency 
payments, disaster payments, federal crop insurance, and crop hail 
insurance are initially analyzed separately. To simulate the choices 
available to producers, various combinations of risk management 
alternatives are analyzed together. Proposed changes in the FCI prog-ram 
will have an impact on the economic welfare of agricultural producers 
who participate in the program. To analyze these effects, the proposed 
FCI progra~ is initially analyzed alone, then compared to existing 
program results and finally analyzed in combination with the current 
deficiency program. 
Risk Management Strategies 
The following summarizes the current commodity program alternatives 
available to risk managers. Participation in a risk avoidance program is 
based on the growth in net worth, firm survival, and the producers 
perception of price and yield uncertainty. The risk management 
strategies analyzed in this study relate to a producer with a relatively 
low beginning equity position. Producers with higher equity levels may 
choose a different program, set of programs, or provide insurance 
internal to the farming operation. This is dependent upon the firm's 
ability to contend with price and yield variability. 
The base run for the farming scenario reveals that there is 
approximately a one in four chance of firm failure. The low equity 
position, combined with an absence of income stabilization makes the 
producer sensitive to variable prices and yields. Further reductions in 
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the equity position significantly increase the chance of bankruptcy. For 
this low equity farming scenario, producers with a lower equity position 
should analyze and determine the feasi9ility of participation in a 
commodity program. 
The results of each current commodity program indicate that the 
impact on net worth and firm survival is dramatic. The variance among 
program results ranges from economic stability, zero bankruptcies with a 
significant growth in net worth to financial collapse, increased 
bankruptcies and the lack of growth in net worth, equal to the base run. 
The financial structure and growth performance of the farming scenario 
depends highly on the commodity program chosen. 
The deficiency payments programs shows increases in the net worth 
position and decreases in the number of bankruptcies for this farming 
scenario. The results of the deficiency program do not equal the 
improvements in net worth and bankruptcy level caused by the disaster 
payments program. The income subsidization present in the DPP creates 
an economic boon for the producer. The disaster payments program yields 
the lowest bankruptcies and largest growth in net worth of all the 
current commodity programs analyzed singularly. 
The lowest ending net worth position is shown when the FCI program 
with no government subsidy at the 50 percent guarantee level is 
analyzed. This type of FCI is typical for the area specified in this 
study and explains why producer participation in the federal crop 
insurance program has historically been very low. Several variables, 
such as premium costs paid by the producer, the per acre guarantee 
level, and the price elective chosen by the producer have significant 
impacts on the economic position of the farming scenario. An example is 
the net returns per acre for the producer who participates in the FCI 
program but does not suffer a crop·loss. The premium cost for coverage 
is subtracted from the net returns to the operator. This reduction in 
net returns does not occur when participating in the disaster program 
because the producer does not pay any direct cost for coverage. 
The combination of current programs reveals the same general 
conclusions as the singular analysis. When the DPP is combined with 
other programs the financial growth and structure of the farm firm 
strengthen. When the FCI program is combined with other programs the 
financial strength weakens. This is evident when comparing the DPP and 
deficiency program to the DPP, deficiency, and federal crop insurance. 
When the FCI program is added to the analysis the mean ending net worth 
decreases. 
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To simulate the possibility of the disaster payments program being 
eliminated, the deficiency and all risk crop insurance is analyzed in 
great detail. The possible elimination of the disaster payments program 
exists because of the large treasury cost involved in providing the 
DPP. The results indicate that this type of alternative, deficiency 
payments and FCI, with current program specifications will increase the 
chance of firm survival and improve ending net worth compared to no 
program alternatives at all. While this alternative does provide a 
better chance of firm survival, it will not provide the same income 
stabilization for the agricultural producer in comparison to the DPP. 
Proposed Program Alternatives 
The current Federal Crop Insurance program has already been amended 
by Congress with the passing of the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. 
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The changes in the program for the 1981 crop year will expand coverage 
to include wheat, grain sorghum, and cotton. The 1981 crop year program 
also has provisions for a 30 percent government premium subsidy for 
producers who participate in the insurance program. 
An analysis of the proposed program is done with estimates for 
grain sorghum and cotton FCI average yields and premium rates. The 
results suggest the new pro_gram provides more income stability to the 
producer, compared to the existing FCI program. The added crop coverage 
of the proposed FCI program substantially reduces the bankruptcies shown 
by the current FCI program, especially with the high average farm 
yields. If the producer is to choose between the proposed FCI program or 
no program alternative, these results suggest increased firm survival and 
growth in ending worth is achieved by participation in the FCI program. 
If the producer is to choose between the existing DPP and the proposed 
FCI program, the same historic low level of participation in the FCI 
program will be prevalent. 
A combination of the proposed FCI program and the deficiency 
program is analyzed. This alternative yields greater financial strength 
than the alternative of existing FCI coverage and deficiency payments. 
This is due to the proposed FCI program which includes premium subsidies 
to producers and the addition of grain sorghum and cotton to the crops 
eligible for coverage. The results also suggest that the chance of firm 
survival increases as the guarantee level increases, even with the 
higher premium costs associated with greater coverage. 
Government Costs 
The cost of providing income stabilization to agricultural producers 
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has grown significantly during recent years. The disaster and deficiency 
payment programs have been financed entirely by the U.S. Government. A 
means to reduce these costs is a major political concern. This study 
presents an analysis of the per acre cost incurred by the producer and 
the government for the existence of disaster payments program and federal 
crop insurance. An analysis is also presented of the expected annual 
government cost over time, based on the probability levels derived from 
the stochastic yield series. 
The per acre cost assumed by the government for providing federal 
crop insurance and the DPP varies significantly, depending on yields. 
The DPP is a costly program for the government even if no direct payments 
are made to producers. While producers may not receive any direct 
payment, the government must finance the administration costs. Under the 
DPP the government has no means to cover the direct payments made to 
producers nor the fixed cost associated with providing the disaster 
payments program. The payments made to producers is inversely related to 
the yield level. As yields decrease the amount of payments made to 
producers increases. The cost of this program is extremely high for 
areas experiencing widespread drought or natural disaster. A comparison 
of the annual government cost reveals the current FCI program is less 
costly than the disaster program. This relationship coincides with past 
levels of government expenditures but it should be noted that the current 
FCI program only provides coverage for the wheat enterprise. 
The framework of the federal crop insurance program provides a means 
for the government to recover a portion of the cost in providing crop 
coverage. The premium costs paid by producers helps offset the direct 
payment and administration costs of the FCI program. When comparing the 
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government cost per acre for the·DPP and the FCI program at a zero yield 
level for \vheat, the FCI program is more costly. With a zero yield 
level, even at the lowest.level of guarantee available under the FCI 
program, the government payment per acre to the producer is larger than 
the DPP •. The government cost per acre under the highest FCI guarantee 
level is nearly double the cost compared to the DPP, when yield levels 
are zero. As the actual yield levels increase, this relationship is 
reversed. The ratio of premium costs to direct producer payments becomes 
smaller as yield levels increase with the FCI. This ratio eventually 
become positive as yields increase to a level where direct payments made 
to producers is offset by producer premium payments. In years when this 
relationship is present, the government has a means to financ.e a portion 
of the administration costs of the FCI program. 
The proposed FCI program which offers producers a premium subsidy 
is more expensive for the government compared to the existing program. 
The net payments made to producers are higher at low yield levels and 
net government receipts will be lower at high yield levels. This 
proposed FCI program may require more government budget outlays than the 
existing FCI program but the subsidy.offered under the new FCI program 
may increase program enrollment. If this increase in FCI participation 
is large enough, a gradual phasing out of the DPP could take place and 
still provide producers with a means of reducing income variability. 
This would be entirely dependent on the actual yield levels producers 
receive. Assuming normal crop yields this overall decrease in government 
cost could be realized with increased FCI participation and a decrease in 
disaster payments program. 
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Policy Implications 
Each of the alternatives in this study is designed to reduce the 
natural risks associated with the agricultural sector and each 
alternative has a unique impact on the net returns to the agricultural 
producers. Recent plans to eliminate the current disaster and deficiency 
program should be given careful consideration, as these programs provide 
a major source of income stabiliization. Without this stability a large 
number of low equity producers will become insolvent. This is evident 
when examining this farming scenario without any type of commodity 
program alternative. The increased firm failure of low equity producers 
will have a dramatic impact on the structure of agriculture. 
P~oposed amendments to the FCI program include producer premium 
subsidies. An analysis of these subsidy levels indicates larger 
subsidies have larger stabilization effects on farm income·. While these 
subsidy levels increase the chance of firm survival, they also increase 
Government expenditures. The Government premium receipts for providing 
insurance is decreased as the subsidy level increases. Combining smaller 
government receipts with expanded crop coverage, larger areas eligible 
for insurance, and greater producer participation due to premium 
subsidies, might increase the cost of the FCI program. 
As the FCI program is expanded to crops currently ineligible for 
coverage, the estimated FCI yield will have an impact on the level of 
firm growth and survival. The results of the proposed FCI analysis 
indicate the firm equity level is increased for larger FCI yields. Based 
on the stochastic yield series used in this study, an overclassification 
or underclassification of FCI yield guarantees will affect producer 
program benefits and the cost incurred by the government.· 
Research Limitations 
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This scope of this study is limited to determining the best possible 
program or combination of programs which reduced the risk associated with 
a particular size and type operation in a specific geographieal location 
in Southwest Oklahoma. Because the model relies heavily on the historic 
price and yield series it would be inappropriate to make generalizations 
of these results to other geographical areas of the country. The trended. 
stochastic and triangularly distributed prices and yields for Southwest 
Oklahoma are not necessarily correlated to other parts of the country.· 
As in all simulation models, numerous assumptions must be made on 
economic variables which are random by nature. Variables such as 
inflation rates, price, and yield trend values, which are specified at a 
constant rate within the model, create a need to establish a range of 
outcomes for different alternatives. Other variables such as land 
ownership, cropping patterns and size of farm may provide a completely 
unique set of results. Of particular interest is the establishment of 
farming scenarios which represent the part-time, full-time, and corporate 
or investor-type farming operation. It is contingent that the largest 
portion of program benefits go to a small majority of large 
operators. The scope of this study is limited to the farming scenario 
analyzed. 
The administration costs associated with government commodity 
programs is not analyzed in detail for this study. The cost structures 
in providing the proposed FCI program are difficult to determine because 
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of the expanding number of crops being covered. It is not within the 
scope of this study to determine whether the additional cost in providing 
the proposed FCI is offset by the benefits received by producers and 
budget savings realized by the government. 
Despite these limitations, this study provides an economic base in 
evaluating the existing commodity programs available to producers. 
Based on this farming scenario, assumptions are made concerning the 
financial stability provided by specific risk management alternatives. 
Need For Additional Research 
Several questions of importance concerning risk management programs 
create a need for further research in an attempt to derive an 
appropriate solution to commodity program inadequacies. An important 
and unanswered question involves the structural impacts commodity 
programs have on American agriculture. Additional research is needed to 
determine if commodity programs promote large scale farming operations. 
These structural issues·have a large impact on the existence of the 
small part-time or family-farm operation. If program benefits do 
encourage large scale farming operations then federal policy can be 
directed at protecting the small agricultural entrepreneur. 
Additional research is needed to determine the best social and 
economic role of private insurance coverage. The governmental 
subsidization of private insurance premiums for multi-peril coverage is a 
possibility that exists. This type alternative would require extensive 
research aimed at specifying realistic rates based on indemnities paid 
over time for natural disasters. The rates charged by the private 
insurance sector and the subsidies provided by the government would be 
related to losses common in a specific area. 
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The impact commodity programs have on land use is an important area 
of consideration. The existence of a liberal commodity program can 
induce inefficient and undesirable land use. The possibility of land 
cultivation in high-risk areas, when it should be used for grazing 
purposes, exists when a commodity· program provides excess coverage. Not 
only do unwise commodity programs encourage crop cultivation in high-risk 
areas, they can also provide a means for producers to avoid losses due to 
their own poor management practices. Research to determine the efficient 
commodity program and level of coverage is needed for high-risk 
agricultural areas. 
These broad questions provide a solid base for additional 
commodity program analysis and research. Answers to these questions 
would provide government administration, policymakers, and legislators 
with a criteria for establishing an economically sound disaster relief 
plan for both producers and the government. 
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